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1. Introduction  
The role of government and the money it spends to fulfill its role has been one of the key 
questions of economics and political philosophy for centuries.  However, only over the past 150 
years has the spending role of the state developed significantly and, thus, has started a vivid debate 
on the appropriate role and size of government. And only over recent decades, when governments 
had grown significantly in size have methodologies emerged to measure, assess and advise on the 
size, performance and efficiency of government and on the underlying policies.  
Government expenditure takes mostly place via the budgets of different levels of 
government. The sum of this spending is typically referred to as the size of government. Public 
spending, which we use as a synonym, comprises spending on various tasks of government. These 
can be categorized according to an economic classification – consumption, investment, interest, 
subsidies and transfers – or a functional classification – education, defense etc. (for details see 
OECD, 2019c). 
The size of government is derived from its spending role in an economy and this is linked 
to the question of what governments do and should do. In this chapter we link public spending with 
the role of government and describe how much governments spend and what they spend it on. We 
also reference non-budgetary expenditure and fiscal risks for government as these are also part of 
the “size” of government in a broader sense. Whether government performs its spending role well 
in terms of objectives, performance and efficiency is subject to analysis in later chapters of this 
volume. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses what the 
government should do. Section 3 addresses the issues related to how should government intervene 
and spend. Section 4 reviews the size of government from a historical perspective. Section 5 
illustrates in a stylized way the composition of public expenditure. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. What Should Government Do? 
         In the distant past, when individuals made a living by hunting and fishing or by subsistence 
agriculture, there was no or little need for a government in today’s sense of the word.  
Consequently, there was no sense in asking what a government should do. Individuals and families 
were largely on their own and were free to pursue their individual interests and to satisfy their 
needs, in the best way they could. Their (very low) standards of living depended on their personal 
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ability to collect food and to protect themselves against natural elements and other dangers. At that 
time, the actions of individuals were not likely to generate significant externalities that could affect, 
positively or negatively, other individuals,  
        With the passing of time individuals started to see the advantages that could come from 
aggregation and from operating in groups, first small groups and progressively larger ones. They 
also started to make distinctions between activities and needs that could best be satisfied through 
their independent actions and needs that could be better satisfied though the collective action of the 
group. As the groups became larger and more stable (in terms of location and membership), and 
less homogeneous in the abilities and the attitudes of the individuals that composed them, a process 
of selection started to develop. The individuals in the groups, or the communities, started to be 
differentiated in different categories, and specialize in their jobs, to better satisfy the perceived, 
collective needs. Productivity increased as specialization spread as Adam Smith (1776) so 
eloquently described. 
        The satisfaction of particular community needs fell to different groups of individuals who 
were assumed to have greater abilities to deal with those needs. Castes or classes started developing 
(see Brown, 2005). Some individuals assumed the task of providing protection against dangers 
coming from the outside. Some, (sorcerers, priests and others) were assigned the task of 
communicating with the gods or the divinities. Others took on the more mundane tasks of providing 
food and dealing with other daily needs of the community. Interaction and exchanges increasingly 
took place in markets, using some form of money as a medium of exchange (see, for instance, 
Brown, 2005, Mishkin, 2004). 
        The larger communities saw also the necessity, or the convenience, of having some 
individuals or some small groups assume the responsibility of making rules for the behavior of the 
individuals in the community. These were embryonic forms of governments, and the assignments 
of the responsibilities described above were rarely made democratically. Much political science 
literature has shown that governments generally came into being out of the domination by one 
group over the rest of the community (see Loria, 1886 and Mosca, 1896). There are probably no 
examples in history of governments, which were born as democratic and in which all individuals 
had equal political power and equal individual freedom. 
        In recent centuries, especially in the 19th century, several, then more advanced, countries 
started showing traits that could be called democratic. Some individuals were given the 
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constitutional right to vote and, through their vote, to influence government policies. With time, 
that right was progressively extended to larger groups, including individuals who had no property, 
and to some who had been effectively serfs or even slaves in the past, and to women (see Tanzi 
2020a).This process of increasing democratization was happening at a time when markets were 
becoming larger in the number of participants and in the territories covered; and they were 
becoming freer from government meddling, than  they had been during the earlier, mercantilist 
times, described by Adam Smith and by others. Democratic countries with market economies 
required some rules to guide the behavior of the citizens and to protect some of their rights, while 
restricting abuses by fellow citizens and the arbitrary power of governments.   
        This led to the important question of what should be the economic role of governments in 
countries that were democratic and that depended on free markets, for the provision of goods and 
services, needed by citizens, and for the generation of incomes, to those who provided the factors 
of production. What should be the scope and limit of the governments’ intervention in these 
societies? Although the latter question had been raised occasionally, over earlier centuries, by some 
philosophers and early economists, it had been raised in broader and more political contexts. In the 
19th Century that became a more important and more specific question, at a time when governments 
were becoming more democratic, and markets freer.  
        In that century, two contrasting schools of thought competed in the market for ideas, and they 
gave very different answers to the above question. The two schools were laissez faire and 
socialism. Notably Mill (1848) and several other economists argued that laissez-faire should be the 
general practice, and anything else would be unwelcome, while the socialist view would postulate 
a stronger government presence in the economy and in society (see Engels, 1880, and the overview 
of Musgrave, 1985). Both of these schools became intellectually and politically important and 
attracted followers and influence among the common citizens and the intellectuals of the day. 
Generally, those who owned wealth tended to favor laissez faire, while many workers were 
attracted by the socialist ideas. This fact started to influence some policies, as for example it did 
the Bismarck pension reforms in Germany in the late 19th Century, when socialism had become 
very influential in Germany and in other countries (see Ashley, 1904).  
        The laissez faire school, which was more unified intellectually than the socialist school, had 
had its beginning with the work of Adam Smith, 1776, and later had come to be influenced by the 
Darwinian’s evolutionary theory. It maintained that the role of the government should be limited 
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and should not interfere with the natural evolution of societies. A free market economy would 
deliver more progress and, over the long run, it would promote growing standards of living for the 
whole populations.  
 The Laissez-faire school stressed the need to protect property rights and the right of citizens 
to engage in legitimate economic activities, without the need for government authorization. It paid 
little attention to the distribution of income or to some, obvious, failures that existed in the market, 
including monopolies. It stressed the importance of individual liberty and the contribution that 
personal initiative made to economic activities. A basic assumption was that, in a free society, with 
a free market, anyone willing to work would be able to find a job and to earn a living income. In 
such a society, property owners inevitably had more political and economic power than workers. 
Property rights tended to receive more government protection than the rights of workers to be well 
paid, and to work in safer jobs.  Social and distributional objectives were not seen as a core role of 
government.  
        The socialist schools, of which there were several branches, some much more radical than 
others, were concerned with the masses, with the distribution of income, and with the status of the 
workers. They were critical of property rights, and much less interested in individual liberty. They 
advocated a larger economic role of the state and pushed for high public spending. Some versions 
of socialism (especially the Marxist version) advocated the expropriation of property and the 
creation of governments which, through central planning, would direct production and the 
distribution of income toward the satisfaction of the “basic needs” of the masses.  
        Both sides often held extreme views. Socialists saw the market role in much less favorable 
eyes and, many of them, considered property as a “theft”. Just how extreme laissez faire had, at 
times, become can be seen by the reaction of the leading Italian economist at that time, Francesco 
Ferrara. In the decade of 1850s he wrote that, by imposing an import duty, the US Federal 
government had committed “a sin as grave as that of slavery” (sic). Similar extreme views were 
expressed by other leading economists, such as F. Bastiat, Gustave de Molinari and J. B. Say in 
France. In Germany a socialist economist, Lassalle, was jailed for advocating in a lecture a 
progressive income tax, which would be “a single progressive income tax in state and community, 
instead of all existing taxes, especially the labor-crushing indirect tax” (see notably Spahr, 1886). 
        In the second half of the 19th and during the 20th Century, the problems that totally free markets 
faced in the real world were being addressed by some economists. Monopolies, which were 
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common and were generating enormous incomes for some individuals, had started to be regulated 
(Wicksell, 1896, see Musgrave and Peacock, 1958). Some rights of workers (to organize, to strike, 
and to have their working hours limited) were recognized and limits were imposed on the age when 
children could work. Safety standards in work places were strengthened. Pension and other 
insurance schemes started to be created for workers and school attendance of children became 
mandatory. During the Great Depression a new important government role, that to fight economic 
recessions, would be theorized by Keynes and it would become a government responsibility during 
the second half of the 20th Century.  
        In the decades after World War II, the pure laissez faire ideology of earlier years was in retreat. 
There was increasing skepticism, even on the part of many orthodox economists, about the assumed 
efficiency of the market without corrections. In addition, there was less tolerance for the income 
distribution that the free market generated. Progressive income taxes became more popular. In the 
years after World War II, there was an intense search by economists for market failures, beyond 
the supplementary role for which public goods had been known. There was a search for ways to 
make the income distribution more equitable. Monopolistic competition came to be seen as 
influencing many markets (Robinson, 1933, Chamberlin, 1948, Musgrave, 1985). 
      In the late 19th century, the size of government was very small, given in part to the prevailing 
view of its limited role (see Section 4). This changed, first, over two World Wars and subsequently 
with the ascent of the welfare state so that especially the post 1960 period witnessed fast increases 
in public spending and in tax levels in advanced countries. It also saw a growing use of regulations, 
to deal with externalities that were assumed to have negative consequences for individuals, or for 
the environment. Definitely, the economic role of the state had changed. It had become larger in 
countries that were still considered market economies (Tanzi and Schuknecht, 2000). 
         Government intervened to deal with: (a) pure public goods and quasi-public goods; (b) with 
various market failures; (c) with negative externalities; (d) with business cycles; (e)  with income 
maintenance for individuals and families unable to earn a living; and, (f)  finally, it intervened to 
make the income distributions closer to what voting societies expected them to be. Tax levels and 
tax revenues’ ratios over GDP went dramatically up, and tax systems became more progressive 
and, especially in some countries, more complex. New government programs were created, some 
aimed at dealing with universal risks (illnesses, disability, unemployment, old age, and illiteracy) 
others, means tested, focused towards economic problems of particular individuals and families. 
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The composition of public expenditure that in the aggregate, makes up the size of government is 
discussed in depth in section 5. 
        The growing economic role of the state, which Keynesian economists had propagated, was 
inevitably controversial. Conservative and libertarian economists, from the Chicago School, the 
Austrian School and the new School of Public Choice, were highly critical of the new government 
role. They believed that it created inefficiencies, reduced economic growth, and reduced the 
freedom and the incentives of individuals who would come to depend on a “nanny state”. These 
critics believed that a state that reduced incentives for individuals and made them more dependent 
on the government had reduced the vitality of economies and economic growth.  
 For instance, Keynesian economists tend to argue that the size of government reflects social 
preferences in more government and more redistribution to correct market failures (including 
Wagner’s law of governments producing superior goods). Other political economists have 
emphasized the role of institutions in shaping the size of government and pointed to political market 
failure in leading to governments being bigger and less efficient than they should be. The size of 
government is affected by voting rules (Husted and Kenny, 1997), interest group competition 
(Becker and Mulligan, 2003), party preferences (Braeuninger, 2005), political centralization (Fiva, 
2006), the prevailing income distribution (Meltzer, 1983) and the degree of openness and 
globalization (Shelton, 2007; Rodrik, 1998; Potrafke, 2009; Dreher et al., 2007). 
        Many studies have assessed the impact that a larger economic role of the state was having on 
macro-economic performance and other objectives (for surveys see Chapters 2, 3 and 23 in this 
Volume). As is often the case in these attempts, the a priori, political biases of those who made the 
attempts often predicted the results. Conservative economists tended to find higher negative results 
from the higher government role, while social democrat economists tended to minimize the 
negative impact of that role. The bottom line is that it is difficult to conclude definitely that 
countries that spend more, such as various European countries, have performed less well than the 
countries that spend less, such as the Anglo-Saxon countries, taken as a group. For instance, Afonso 
and Jalles (2006) report that the detrimental effect of government size on economic activity is 
stronger the lower institutional quality and the positive effect of institutional quality on output 
increases with smaller government sizes. Often the way in which the money is spent and the way 
in which the taxes were collected is more important than the size of the spending and of the taxing 
(see Tanzi, 2020a and 2020b). 
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        Naturally, the macroeconomic performance of the economies, though important, is just one 
measure of the impact of the role of government on economic welfare. In recent decades the 
importance of that measure has been challenged by observers who have pointed out that much of 
the economic growth, in several countries, including the USA, has benefitted a small share of the 
population, while the large majority has seen little improvement in its standard of living. Therefore, 
there may have been growth but by other measures, there may have been little genuine development 
or improvement of well-being (Hessami, 2010). For example the recent, inequality- adjusted 
Human Development Index, prepared by the United Nations, lists high and low spending countries 
among the top performers (Davies, 2009).  
            It may, therefore, be possible and legitimate to focus on the impact that a larger government 
role has not only on economic growth but also on various socio-economic indicators considered 
important (Parts 2 - 4 of this Volume, also Tanzi and Schuknecht, 1997; Afonso, Schuknecht and 
Tanzi, 2005, Schuknecht 2020). Another important dimension of this theme is the interaction 
between the role and efficiency of the public sector and its susceptibility (or resilience) to crisis 
and (external) credibility for investors (Part 4).  
As an illustration, Chart 1 depicts several cases of performance and efficiency in a European 
Union country sample, where both performance and efficiency of government spending can go 
hand in hand. 
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Chart 1 – Illustrative evidence on public sector performance and efficiency, 2000 
(Considering general government spending) 
 
Source: adapted from Afonso et al. (2005).  
Notes: good performance (two right-hand side quadrants), include lower efficiency/higher spending (Finland, Sweden, 
and Denmark) and higher efficiency/lower spending (Austria, Japan, Ireland, US).  
 
   3. How Should Government Intervene and Spend? 
        It is very difficult or perhaps even impossible to provide a simple and universally- appropriate 
list of ways in which governments should intervene in the economy, and of how much they should 
tax, spend and regulate. Different governments may aim at promoting different objectives, and 
there is no universally unquestioned way to select a list that may be optimal for all societies. That 
list may give prominence to economic growth, without much concern for how the growth is 
distributed among the citizens. It could give prominence to the promotion of important socio-
economic indicators, giving more weight to the importance of some of them. It could promote 
protection against risks and it could choose the promotion of more equal income distribution, and 
others.  
        In the past, economic growth received much attention. In today’s democratic countries the 
decision on the preferred objective must be made in the democratic political process. They must 
also respect basic, fundamental, human rights, to protect minorities from possible excesses 
promoted by the majority including protecting property rights, as stressed by the school of public 
choice. In fact, this has been a basic condition for many constitutions. 
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        Whatever is the main objective chosen, it is important that the government’s intervention not 
be arbitrary and that it respects some basic rules, and be promoted efficiently in the use of scarce 
resources. It should not become a major drag on the economy, as it has in some countries in the 
past and present. The intervention should promote indicators that contribute to the economic and 
social welfare of the citizens. Too much emphasis on single variables, be these the growth of GDP, 
or changes in the Gini coefficient, is generally not desirable. Economists who suggest a single 
objective or a short list of objectives generally ignore the diversity of countries’ situations. They, 
thus, risk stating criteria that often are not necessarily desirable or important.  
Advanced countries have a different capacity to intervene, and different needs for their 
governments to do so, than developing countries. This difference has been recognized for a long 
time (see Newbery and Stern, 1986 and Tanzi, 1991, and the public finance literature related to 
developing countries). Countries with more even income distributions may have different reasons 
and justification for the government to intervene than countries that feature more inequality. 
Countries with more efficient markets, in which the incomes received are considered as genuinely 
incomes earned and not considered rents, have more trust in the market and thus less justifications 
for governments to intervene, than countries with less efficient markets.1  
        Governments with public employees who respect Weberian criteria of behavior have more 
ability to intervene successfully than those with less efficient, politically chosen, and less honest 
employees. When governments are less corrupt and more efficient, there is, in principle, more 
scope for government activity while inefficient, rent-seeking governments should be smaller 
(Dzhumasher, 2013). Additionally, countries that give more weight to the objectives of the 
collectivity (such as a more even income distribution or better dealing with universal risks), have 
more reasons for governments to intervene than countries where individual freedom is given more 
weight. 
        The first, main reason for government interventions is the provision of classic public goods. 
Of these, so-called pure public goods (defense, judiciary, and security) are a government 
intervention on which most economists have agreed. However, the real world problem with this 
intervention is that, while there is agreement that governments must intervene and must provide 
public goods, there is no guidance on how much of those goods should be provided. The theory 
does not provide a clear guidance on what is the optimal amount of defense spending; or how much 
                                                        
1 For the link between governments spending and inequality see Afonso et al, 2010b. 
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should be spent for providing protection to individuals and property, or for justice, or 
infrastructures. The political debates in countries are focused not on whether the government 
should provide these public goods but on how much of them it should provide. In this, the theory 
is not helpful. 
        The debates are sharper in the provision of so-called quasi-public goods (education, health, 
and some others) for which the justification on allocation grounds, combines with that on equity 
grounds. When a government (or private providers financed by government) is not providing good 
public schools, or good health services for everyone, it is creating different income opportunities 
for different categories of citizens, and it is perpetuating income differences, across different 
categories of citizens. In this case, what has been called the “birth lottery” ends up determining the 
future life incomes of many citizens. Countries where citizens care about avoiding large, 
permanent, income differences among them are more likely to want publicly financed good schools 
and good health services for everyone, to create more equal opportunities. This objective requires 
higher taxes and public spending.  
In this context, increasing tax rates will generate deadweight burden, and the heavier the tax 
rates, the less it may yield relatively. The loss of utility for the individual taxpayer increases with 
the square of the tax (Dupuit, 1844, pp. 281). Additionally, Afonso and Gaspar (2007) illustrate 
numerically that financing through distortional taxation causes excess burden (deadweight loss) 
magnifying the costs of inefficiency.  
         The above arguments have implications for the level of public spending, the composition of 
expenditure and for the structure of the tax systems needed to finance the spending. Public 
programs that aim at dealing with universal risks of all citizens, or that aim at creating more equal 
opportunities for more citizens are inevitably more expansive, and must be financed by broader-
based taxes requiring lower marginal tax rates than means-tested programs. The alternative of 
having means-tested programs, accessible by only selected groups, and accompanying them with 
“tax expenditure”, as the US and some other countries have done, reduces the level of taxes and 
spending but leads to other difficulties (Tanzi, 2020a). 
        Finally, an issue that has been highlighted by the 2020 coronavirus epidemics is that the 
traditional literature on the desirable economic role of the state has dealt with that role in 
equilibrium situations, and with changes at the margin of the equilibrium created by the political 
market (Tanzi, 2020c). In other words it has not dealt with shocks to the system when the role of 
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the state may become especially important. We know that during major wars, the government role 
changes and becomes particularly important. Price controls, rationing, appropriation of resources, 
very high marginal tax rates, and other policies that are not market friendly are used. Many years 
ago, Peacock and Wiseman, in a classic 1961 book, also argued that wars had even changed 
permanently the economic role of the state.  
        Shocks to the economic systems of countries may come from major wars, natural catastrophes, 
depressions, revolutions, pandemics and others calamities. Limited government intervention, may 
become less optimal in a world that is subjected to occasional, existential shocks. Such shocks 
often reveal major gaps in the role of the state. Still, it remains an open question whether additional 
resources for government would actually be spent on making countries more resilient against major 
shocks. The Coronavirus epidemics is a case in point: countries with very large public sectors and 
countries with smaller public sectors all struggle to address the issue.               
With these considerations in mind, it comes to no surprise that there is no conclusive result 
on how big government should be and what its optimal size is. In some earlier work, two of  the 
authors of this paper had suggested that when the promotion of several, un-weighted, socio-
economic indicators is the objective of the policy, a level of public spending of around 30-35 
percent of GDP may set the desirable limit (Tanzi and Schuknecht, 2000). And some earlier work 
by all three authors had focused on the quantitative connection that may exist between the level of 
public spending and some important socio-economic indicators (Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi, 
2005, 2010a). They found that if these indicators reflect the desirable objectives, lower levels of 
public spending are possible. 
As to the literature on the presumably “optimal” size of government, lower estimates of 
government spending are below 20% for certain advanced countries (Vedder and Gallaway, 1998). 
Many estimates are in the 30% to lower 40% range, though optima differ very much across 
countries (Tanzi and Schuknecht, 2000; Pecvin, 2004; Facchini and Melki, 2013; Fort and 
Magazzoni, 2010; Afonso and Schuknecht, 2019 and Schuknecht, 2020). Actual public 
expenditure, is mostly significantly higher, suggesting the potential for considerable expenditure 
savings in many countries, even when considering the need for some spare capacities in the 
provision of certain public goods such as health or defense for big shocks and emergencies. It could 
be added that some countries including Sweden, Canada and others in the 1990s reduced 
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dramatically public spending while suffering no visible consequences (Schuknecht and Tanzi, 
2005). 
 
4. The Size of Government from a Historical Perspective 
4.1. Public spending since the late 19th century 
Over the past 150 years, the size of government developed in line with the evolving thinking 
about its role and its capacity to raise taxes. See Tanzi, 2018. Moreover, in recent decades it 
reflected increasingly the growing role of social spending and the creation of welfare state. 
In the late 19th century, at the time when laissez-faire was still the dominant economic 
philosophy, government only absorbed a very limited share of economic resources in the countries 
that are today’s advanced economies. About 1870 when data on public finances started to be 
available in more countries, public expenditure averaged only 11.1% of GDP (Table 1). 2 
Switzerland and Australia featured as “big” governments, exceeding 15% of GDP, while Sweden 
and the United States reported spending well below 1/10th of GDP. This picture had not changed 
much before the beginning of World War I, only that the later warring countries Austria, Germany 
and France joined the group of relatively “high” public spending. Public revenue in peace times 
was broadly in line with public expenditure, following a (mostly) unwritten rule of balanced 
budgets outside wars. 
 
[Table 1] 
 
With World War I, public expenditure and revenue increased considerably and the 
protagonists of World War I reported the highest expenditure ratios: Germany, France, Italy and 
the United Kingdom governments spent more than ¼ of GDP on the back of continuously high 
receipts after the war (Peacock and Wiseman, 1961). Just before World War II, public expenditure 
ratios had increased somewhat further to an average of 23.4% in today’s advanced countries, partly 
in the wake of the Great Depression and partly already reflecting war preparations (Tanzi and 
Schuknecht, 2000). In the 90 years since 1870, the public expenditure ratio had hence roughly 
doubled from 1/9th to almost ¼ of GDP.  
                                                        
2 We always refer to figures for general government, except in a few instances of historical data. General government 
includes central, regional and local government and public social security as its most important components. 
14 
 
 
4.2. Public expenditure since about 1960 
In the next 60 years, public expenditure ratios doubled yet again and, yet again, there were 
some distinct waves. After World War II, war-related expenditure declined while some other 
spending increased so that the overall spending ratio increased modestly to 27.9% of GDP by 1960. 
This reflected the buildup of basic safety nets over previous decades as well as growing public 
services such as education and infrastructure. Some European countries reported the largest public 
sectors, with Austria and France reporting around 35% of GDP. Spain, Japan and Switzerland still 
featured total public expenditure below 20% of GDP. Revenue and expenditure had been mostly 
well aligned since World War II, so that on the back of strong growth and some inflation public 
debt had come down significantly across the industrialized world. 
The period from 1960 to 1980 saw an unprecedented increase in public expenditure by 15 
percentage points of GDP on average in just 20 years. This was the heydays of Keynesian 
economics when governments actively developed public services and welfare states to today’s 
universal systems in many countries. While public expenditure averaged 43% in the reported 
country sample, it exceeded 50% of GDP in the small European countries of Austria, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden. Another group of countries’ governments, including most non-
Europeans, were still “only” absorbing 1/3 of national resources, though this was also much above 
the level of 1960.  
The biggest difference to earlier peacetime episodes was perhaps the growing mis-
alignment of expenditure and revenue. By 1980 and growing afterward, fiscal deficits had become 
significant and chronic.   Public debts grew together with the rising real interest rates and the fiscal 
deficits. , The strong increase in sovereign debt from the 1970s, continued throughout the coming 
decades in most countries.  
In the1980s and 1990s, skepticism about “big” government and a more market-friendly 
intellectual environment (referred to above) resulted in a major slowdown in public expenditure 
dynamics. By the year 2000, average expenditure ratios were not very different from 1980. A 
significant number of countries had undertaken expenditure reforms in the 1990s so that 
expenditure ratios had declined significantly by more than 5% of GDP in Belgium, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. By contrast, Finland, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain 
and Japan experienced further increases in the public spending ratio by over 5% of GDP.  
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The 2000s were quite a roller-coaster but, on the whole, Keynesian and pro-government 
thinking had a major revival. Buoyant spending in the boom years of the early 2000s were 
succeeded by an explosion of public expenditure ratios following the financial crisis. A number of 
European countries undertook major expenditure savings and reforms.  
The year 2017 saw total public expenditure ratios only moderately above the level of 2000 
(43.9 vs 42.7% of GDP).  However, this understates the “true” increase in the role of government. 
Discounting the decline in interest spending, primary expenditure (total minus debt service) 
increased by 3% of GDP. In 2017, Belgium, Denmark, Finland and France reported the highest 
public expenditure ratios above 50% of GDP. Most non-European countries reported public 
expenditure below 40% of GDP and spending in Ireland and Singapore were even below 30% of 
GDP. In several, notably large countries, including the US, France, Japan, Italy and Spain, deficits 
were still significant, leaving public debt much above pre-financial crisis levels. 
In this environment, the COVID-19 or Coronavirus crisis struck in early 2020. First 
projections by the European Commission for most advanced countries suggested a further major 
increase in expenditure ratios in 2020 that was expected to partially reverse with the recovery 
projected for 2021. Expenditure ratios were expected to increase by an average of over 7% of GDP 
in 2020 (Annex Table 1). Top ratios would reach about 60% of GDP.  
Rather than focusing on the details, it is more important to take note of the pattern: just as 
during the global financial crisis, expenditure ratios were expected to increase massively and very 
rapidly before declining again. In the global financial crisis, expenditure ratios increased between 
4% of GDP in less affected countries and up to 11% of GDP in the most affected ones (Schuknecht, 
2020). 
 
4.3. Expenditure across country groups 
It also interesting to look at public expenditure across country groups from a global 
perspective (Table 2).3 Advanced countries had the highest expenditure ratios in the late 2010s. 
General government spending amounted to 42% of GDP in 2018 (Table 2a). Amongst emerging 
market economies in Europe and Asia, public expenditure ratios were typically close to those 
prevailing in the advanced countries with smaller government sectors. Most Eastern European 
                                                        
3 See also OECD (2019a) for a discussion of budgeting and budget procedures and OECD (2019c) for an overview of 
spending categories and data. 
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countries feature public expenditure between 30 and 40 percent of GDP, and Russia and China fall 
into the same range (Table 2b).  
[Table 2a, b] 
 
The average for emerging and developing countries stood at 31.3% of GDP in 2018 and in 
a few countries, public expenditure was even below 20% of GDP (Table 2a and Annex Table 2). 
Setting these numbers in perspective with the history for advanced economies shows that the size 
of government in developing and emerging countries in the late 2010s was close to levels prevailing 
in advanced economies in the early 1960s. Europe reported the highest public expenditure ratio, 
near 44.3% of GDP in 2018. In much of Southern and Northern Europe, this ratio was closer to 
50%.  
Public expenditure in Latin and North America stood at 36.6% and Asia/Oceania at 30.5%. 
It is interesting to note that amongst the large emerging economies outside Europe, Brail reports 
the highest expenditure ratio at 41.6%, which is near the industrial country average. China at 
37.6%, India at 27.7% and Indonesia at 22.2% show much smaller public sectors.  
In Africa, spending ratios averaged 27.3%, ranging from over 40% of GDP in South Africa 
to well below 20% in Ethiopia and Nigeria. These differences reflect differences in development 
stages (poorer countries spend and tax less) and in the assigned role of government (Asia and 
America seeing less of a role for government than much of Europe). They also reflect the ability 
of governments to raise tax revenue (see Tanzi, 2018). 
Naturally, it is not straightforward to accurately identify the effects of public sector 
spending on outcomes such as economic growth, and distinguish the effect of government spending 
from other determinants. Moreover, comparing expenditure ratios across countries implicitly 
assumes that production costs for public services are proportionate to GDP per capita. 
 
4.4. Expenditure obligations outside the budget 
Over the past three decades, it has become increasingly evident that budgetary expenditure 
do not provide a complete picture of government expenditure obligations. Due to the fact that 
population aging, expenditure on old-age benefits, and notably health, pensions and long-term care, 
are likely to create dynamic needs in the future. The increase in social expenditure in the coming 
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three decades could well be several percent of GDP even under optimistic assumptions (OECD 
2017 and 2019; EU Commission, 2018).  
Moreover, financial crisis (and, most recently, the Coronavirus crisis) periodically cause 
sustained major expenditure increases. In the Global Financial Crisis, countries like Ireland or 
Greece spent more than 30% of GDP on bank recapitalization (IMF, 2015). Other transmission 
channels from the financial sector to public finances can also lead to significant costs (Schuknecht, 
2019).  
 
5. The Composition of Public Expenditure 
5.1. Public expenditure composition from an economic perspective 
Total public expenditure can be decomposed in two ways. From the economic perspective, 
public expenditure consists of public consumption or real expenditure (broadly, spending on goods 
and services, wages and salaries), investment (mostly infrastructure and buildings), the service of 
public debt (interest payments), transfers (mostly social benefits) and subsidies (to enterprises or 
consumers). International organizations such as the OECD and the IMF publish the relevant 
statistics and describe the underlying policies in many publications (see Bibliography for a 
selection). 
 In the advanced countries, public consumption and transfers/social benefits are the most 
important expenditure components, accounting together for roughly 80% of spending (Table 3a). 
Wages and salaries for civil servants account for over 20%. Public investment is another 5-10% of 
the total. 4  Subsidies and interest expenditure are rather small components in most advanced 
countries.5 
[Table 3] 
 
 The expenditure composition, however, changed significantly over the past 150 years. For 
advanced countries, public investment as a share of total public expenditure has almost 
continuously declined since the late 19th century from about 20% to well below 10% of total 
spending in the 2010s (Chart 2). In recent decades, it also declined as a ratio of GDP. By contrast, 
                                                        
4 See IMF (2019) for a discussion of public investment and its management. Public investment, some argue, is always 
productive by definition. However, there are also studies finding the opposite with high spending correlating with 
much corruption (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1998). 
5 There is a considerable literature on subsidies and their role in the economy. See e.g. Beers and de Moor (2001). 
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social expenditure, which was very low 150 years ago, had increased to over half of total spending 
in the 2010s. Social expenditure had grown from less than 1% of GDP to almost ¼ of GDP in 
2016.6 
 
Chart 2 – The Rising Share of Social Expenditure 
(% of Total Public Expenditure) 
 
 
Sources: Schuknecht, 2020. 
 
 When looking across country groups, spending on public consumption, compensation of 
employees, investment and even subsidies is relatively similar between advanced and 
emerging/developing countries, even though individual country differences may, of course, be 
huge. Africa features somewhat higher subsidies, Asia reports above average public investment 
spending. Differences are significant for debt service and Africa and to a lesser extent Latin 
America use a larger share of public expenditure to service their public debt. Advanced countries 
have been benefitting from near zero interest rates in the 2010s so that interest spending averaged 
little over 1% of GDP in 2018. 
 The biggest difference across country groups is on transfers, which comprises mainly social 
benefits. Advanced country spending at 21.4% of GDP is twice as high as developing and emerging 
                                                        
6 This risks of crowding out other, more productive spending and undermining fiscal sustainability. Schuknecht and 
Zemanek (2020) call this the risk of social dominance in public expenditure. 
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country spending of 9.9% of GDP on this category. Europe is the biggest spender, Africa reports 
the lowest figures of 8.5% of GDP on average. Asia and the Americas report spending of 12.6% 
and 13.2%, respectively. In fact, the difference in the size of welfare states explains most of the 
differences in total spending across regions and continents. 
  
5.2. Public expenditure from a functional perspective 
 When looking at public expenditure from a functional perspective, there are a number of 
categories worth looking at in some more detail. It is interesting to note that the classic public 
goods – education, health, defense and public order and safety – “only” absorb a relatively modest 
share of public resources in all country groups (Table 3b).7 Governments in advanced countries 
spend about 4% of GDP or 12% of their total outlays on education. The average for emerging and 
developing countries is somewhat lower at 3.4% of GDP, which is also slightly above 10% of total 
outlays. However, again, there is considerably more variation across individual countries (Annex 
Table). All regions outside Europe spend between 3 ½ and 4% of GDP. For Africa, this is the 
highest share of total spending, at about 15% which is in part due to the greater number of children 
in school age. 8 
Public health spending is highest in advanced countries and notably in Europe at over 6% 
of GDP. The equivalent figure is less than ½ of that (2.3% of GDP) for developing and emerging 
economies and only 1.5% of GDP in Africa. Generally, countries where citizens live longer, have 
higher public health spending. 
 Spending on external and internal security – defense and public order and safety – is quite 
similar across country groups. The combined spending is 3% of GDP, or about 7-10 percent of 
total spending. Environmental spending is a relatively new category absorbing less than 1% of 
GDP in all groups. Advanced countries spend relatively much more than developing and emerging 
economies. Asia/Oceania and Europe spend the most but still, on average less than 1% of GDP. 
However, this is not surprising given that environmental protection is promoted mainly through 
regulation and taxation.  
 Taking these categories (excluding health) together, they amount to 10-15% of GDP or 
about 30-35% of total public expenditure. This is not much, given the importance of these 
                                                        
7 See OECD (2017a, 2017b, 2018a and 2019b) for a discussion of education, pension and health expenditure. 
8 For government spending efficiency assessments on education and health see, notably, Afonso and St. Aubyn (2006, 
2011). 
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objectives. It illustrates that most public spending is on other things and, notably, on social 
expenditure.  
 
5.3. Social Expenditure 
Given its growing importance, social expenditure deserves some further discussion. Social 
expenditure, as defined by the OECD, includes socially related transfers and subsidies and certain 
other government expenditure for social purposes. The main categories are pensions, health, long-
term care, family and child benefits and unemployment. Education is mostly not included (except 
below primary education).  
In 1960, the first year for which detailed, comparable cross-country data from the OECD 
became available, advanced countries spent on average almost 10% of GDP on social expenditure 
(Table 4). The range was enormous, from 3.5% in Japan to 15.4% in Germany. By 1980, social 
expenditure had grown to 16.6% of GDP as the period after World War Two witnessed the birth 
and expansion of many social programs. Subsequently, the ratio grew another 2% of GDP per 
decade to 24.1% on average by 2016.  
[Table 4] 
 
As regards individual countries, in 2016, France spent almost one third of GDP on social 
matters (31.5%) followed closely by Italy and several smaller European countries. A number of 
other advanced countries as well as all of emerging Eastern Europe reported spending below 20% 
of GDP (Schuknecht, 2020). In Korea, this figure was only 10.4% as the welfare state was still less 
developed. For emerging and developing countries outside Europe, comparable figures are not 
available but social benefits and transfers were typically lower. 
The main components of social expenditure are public pensions, public health and, 
increasingly, long term care. These are all related to aging of the populations. Pension spending 
increased from an average of 4.5% in 1960 to 9.4% of GDP in 2014-15 in the country group of 
Table 4. The health-spending share almost tripled from 2.4% to 7% of GDP in this group. Long 
term care spending was virtually inexistent in 1960 and reached several percent of GDP in a number 
of countries in the 2010s (OECD, 2017a and 2017b, and 2019b). 
The main driver of social expenditure used to be the expansion of programs to universal 
coverage and to technical progress in health. In recent years, demographics have become the most 
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important driver.  It will contribute to further strong increases in the social expenditure ratio in the 
coming decades, if policies and benefits are not adjusted (see above). 
 
5.4. The Financing of Public Expenditure 
Government expenditure needs to be financed either from revenue, from debt or through 
external grants or sales of public assets. Most expenditure is financed by domestic revenue, but the 
figures also show, that most countries and country groups run deficits and finance part of their 
spending from other sources (fees, fines at al.). In 2018, the unweighted average revenue for 
advanced countries of 42.2% showed a broadly balanced budget when looking at the unweighted 
average. However, this figure masked the fact that most large advanced countries (including the 
United States, Japan, and several large European countries) reported significant deficits. Emerging 
and development countries featured revenue of 28% and thus notable average deficits. For Africa, 
the revenue shortfall amounted to over 5% of GDP.  
 It is also worthwhile throwing a quick glance at the revenue composition (Table 3c). 
Advanced countries manage to finance over one third of their spending or 15.2% of GDP with 
direct taxes on labour income and on profits. Indirect taxes are much more important in developing 
and emerging countries where they finance almost a third of all spending (9.8% of GDP). This 
figure is about 40% in Africa. Social security contributions are quite important in advanced 
countries and contribute 9% of GDP to total revenue. This figure is 10.8% in Europe but only 4.4% 
in the Americas, 2.7% in Europe and as low as 0.5% of GDP in Africa.   
 
6. Conclusions                  
Economists today would probably all agree that governments should provide certain core 
public goods via public expenditure: defense and internal security, public infrastructure, public 
education, and basic social safety nets. When looking at the size of the state that finances these 
goods and services, however, there are remarkable differences over time and across countries.  
150 years ago, when the role of government started to develop in the direction of modern 
states, governments of today’s advanced economies spent barely more than one tenth of national 
income. By 1960, 60 years ago, the picture had changed completely and governments spent almost 
30% of GDP as public goods and services and social security systems expanded. By the 2010s, 
advanced countries spent typically between 30 and 55% of GDP, with social expenditure absorbing 
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an ever-greater share of total spending. Spending on security, infrastructure and education absorbed 
little more than 10% of GDP.  
While a number of advanced countries spend not much more than 30% of GDP, there are 
also bigger governments whose social and economic performance seems to be high. Hence, there 
is no “optimal” size of government even though most if not all governments could probably become 
more efficient and, thus, spend less. Moreover, financial (or health) crises can result to large, 
sudden increases in expenditure ratios. Countries with low spending (and low public debt), by 
definition are likely to have more buffers to accommodate such crises without doubt about the 
sustainability of public finances. 
By contrast, emerging and developing countries typically feature much smaller states than 
advanced countries and there are few exceptions to this. Some countries are fast growing and with 
small states (such as Vietnam or Indonesia) so that spending of 20-30% of GDP seems sufficient 
for them, – similar to Western countries around 1960. Some countries, by contrast feature 
governments that are very “poor” with low revenue and inefficient services contributing to little 
growth and development. An expenditure ratio of 10-15% of GDP is not enough to finance a well-
functioning modern state. 
Looking forward, the challenges across country groups, therefore, look very different. 
Advanced countries need good and efficient, not necessarily bigger government, and sometimes 
government may perhaps, already be too big. Moreover, they must make sure that the size of 
government remains financeable. Core services need to be of high quality and well-financed and 
social expenditure or financial crisis costs must not undermine fiscal sustainability.  
Emerging economies may not need to spend more but they also need to have governments 
adapting to the needs of themselves being more and more advanced economies. Increasing 
demands for welfare benefits and population aging are likely to raise their size of government. 
Developing countries often still struggle with providing well-functioning services, basic safety 
nets, and a strong tax administration. However, more and more governments are demonstrating 
that progress is feasible also in that country group. 
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Table 1 - Total Expenditure by General Government (% of GDP) 
 About 
1870 
About 
1913 
About 
1920 
About 
1937 
1960 1980 2000 2017 
Euro area                 
Austria 10.5 17.0 14.7 20.6 35.7 50.0 51.0 49.1 
Belgium 1/ .. 13.8 22.1 21.8 30.3 54.9 49.1 52.2 
Finland .. .. .. .. .. 40.0 48.0 53.7 
France 12.6 17.0 27.6 29.0 34.6 46.3 51.4 56.5 
Germany 10.0 14.8 25.0 34.1 32.9 46.9 44.7 43.9 
Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. 46.4 48.0 
Ireland 2/ .. .. 18.8 25.5 28.0 48.9 30.9 26.1 
Italy 13.7 17.1 30.1 31.1 30.1 40.6 46.6 48.9 
Netherlands 1/ 9.1 9.0 13.5 19.0 33.7 55.2 41.8 42.6 
Portugal .. .. .. .. .. 32.3 42.6 45.9 
Spain 1/ .. 11.0 8.3 13.2 18.8 32.2 39.2 41.0 
Other EU          
Denmark .. .. .. .. .. 52.7 52.7 51.9 
Sweden 5.7 10.4 10.9 16.5 31.0 60.1 53.4 49.1 
UK 9.4 12.7 26.2 30.0 32.2 47.6 35.4 41.1 
Other advanced 
economies 
         
Australia 18.3 16.5 19.3 14.8 22.2 33.6 36.4 36.4 
Canada .. .. 16.7 25.0 28.6 41.6 41.4 41.1 
Japan 8.8 8.3 14.8 25.4 17.5 32.0 38.0 39.2 
Korea .. .. .. .. .. 23.0 24.7 32.4 
New Zealand .. .. 24.6 25.3 26.9 38.1 37.5 38.7 
Singapore .. .. .. .. .. .. 19.6 .. 
Switzerland 16.5 14.0 17.0 24.1 17.2 32.8 33.8 34.7 
US 7.3 7.5 12.1 19.7 27.0 34.9 33.7 37.8 
Average 3/ 11.1 13.0 18.9 23.4 27.9 43.2 42.7 43.9 
 
Sources: Schuknecht (2020), based on OECD, Ameco, WEO, Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000). Year indicated or nearest 
year available.  
1/ Central government until 1937. 
2/ When taking GNP instead of GDP for Ireland, the ratios for 2000 and 2017 are 35.5% and 32.9% respectively. 
3/ Unweighted, excluding SGP (Singapore) and KOR (South Korea). 
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Table 2 – Total expenditure (% of GDP) 
 
a. Country Groups 
b. Eastern Europe, 
Russia and China 
 2017/18   2017 
Advanced 42.0 Czech Republic 38.9 
Emerging & 
Developing 32.5 
Estonia 
39.2 
G20 38.1 Latvia 33.5 
  Lithuania 29.7 
Africa 28.2 Hungary 46.5 
Latin and North 
America 36.6 
Poland 
41.2 
Asia/Oceania 30.6 Slovakia 40.4 
Europe 44.3   
  Russia 34.8 
    China 32.3 
Sources: OECD, IMF, Schuknecht (2020). 
 
Table 3 – Public Expenditure Composition, General Government, 2018 or latest available 
year (% of GDP) 
 
a. Economic classification  
Country groups 
Total 
spending 
Public 
consumption 
Compensation 
of employees 
Government 
investment 
Net interest 
payments Transfers 
OECD 41.5 16.6 9.9 3.3 1.2 19.7 
Advanced 42.0 16.7 9.9 3.3 1.1 21.4 
Emerging & Developing 31.3 16.9 8.1 3.1 2.2 9.9 
Africa 27.3 NA 7.6 2.8 3.0 8.5 
Latin and North America 36.6 16.8 9.5 2.6 2.5 13.2 
Asia/Oceania 30.6 13.8 6.9 4.2 1.0 12.6 
Europe 44.3 17.7 10.6 3.2 1.2 23.0 
Note: Group averages are simple averages of the countries included for each region.   
Source: OECD, IMF, BCG, 2018 or latest available year. See Annex for detailed notes. 
 
b. Functional classification 
Country groups Education Health Defense 
Public 
order and 
safety 
Environment
al protection 
Social 
Protection 
OECD 5.0 6.6 1.4 1.6 0.7 15.6 
Advanced 5.0 6.7 1.5 1.6 0.7 15.9 
Emerging & Developing 3.4 2.3 1.2 1.6 0.2 6.0 
Africa 3.6 1.5 1.2 1.5 0.2 2.9 
Latin and North America 3.9 4.4 1.3 1.7 0.2 7.7 
Asia/Oceania 3.7 3.8 1.6 1.4 0.6 7.0 
Europe 4.9 6.4 1.3 1.6 0.7 17.8 
Note: Group averages are simple averages of the countries included for each region.   
Source: OECD, IMF, BCG, 2018 or latest available year. See Annex for detailed notes. 
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Table 4 – Social Expenditure (% of GDP) 
 
 1960 1980 1990 1999 2007 2009 2016 
Euro area              
Austria 15.0 22.0 23.2 25.8 25.1 27.5 27.8 
Belgium 11.4 23.1 24.4 24.6 24.9 28.6 29.0 
Finland 8.2 17.7 23.3 23.8 22.9 26.9 30.8 
France 12.0 20.2 24.3 28.6 28.0 30.5 31.5 
Germany 15.4 21.8 21.4 25.5 24.1 26.7 25.3 
Greece 3.3 9.9 15.7 18.0 20.6 23.7 27.0 
Ireland 1 7.1 15.7 16.8 13.7 15.8 22.2 16.1 
Italy 10.7 17.4 20.7 22.8 24.7 27.7 28.9 
Netherlands 9.6 23.3 24.0 19.1 19.9 21.6 22.0 
Portugal .. 9.5 12.2 17.2 21.8 24.6 24.1 
Spain .. 15.0 19.2 19.8 20.8 25.4 24.6 
  
      
Other EU  
      
Denmark .. 20.3 22.0 24.5 25.0 28.3 28.7 
Sweden 12.6 24.8 27.2 28.0 25.5 27.7 27.1 
UK 9.7 15.6 15.2 17.7 19.5 23.0 21.5 
  
      
Other advanced economies 
     
Australia 5.9 10.3 13.1 17.3 15.9 17.0 19.1 
Canada 8.1 13.3 17.5 16.0 16.2 18.0 17.2 
Japan 3.5 10.2 11.1 16.0 18.5 21.9 23.1 
Korea .. .. 2.7 5.8 7.1 8.5 10.4 
New Zealand 11.4 16.7 20.5 18.7 18.1 20.4 19.7 
Singapore  
      
Switzerland 4.2 12.8 12.1 17.0 16.8 18.6 19.7 
US 7.0 12.8 13.2 14.2 15.9 18.6 19.3 
  
      
Average 2/ 9.1 16.6 18.9 20.4 21.0 23.9 24.1 
 
Source: Schuknecht, 2020 based on OECD, Social Expenditure. 
1/ When taking GNP instead of GDP for Ireland, the ratios for 2000 & 2017 are 15.8% and 19.6%. 
2/ Unweighted, excl. KOR and SGP. 
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Table 5 – Total Revenue and Revenue Composition, General Government, 2018 or latest 
available year (% of GDP) 
 
Country groups 
Total 
revenue 
Direct 
taxes 
Indirect 
taxes 
Social 
contributions 
OECD 41.0 13.9 11.7 8.8 
Advanced 42.2 15.2 11.7 9.0 
Emerging & Developing 28.0 7.2 9.8 3.0 
     
Africa 21.9 7.4 8.7 0.5 
Latin and North America 32.3 8.0 8.9 4.4 
Asia/Oceania 28.9 8.9 9.0 2.7 
Europe 44.3 14.2 12.8 10.8 
 
Note: Group averages are simple averages of the countries included for each region.   
Source: Total revenue averages are based on data from the OECD (2018), except for Argentina, Australia, China, 
Colombia, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Russia, Switzerland, United States (OECD, 2017), Brazil, 
Chile (2016), Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, Vietnam (IMF, 2018), 
Egypt (IMF, 2015). Averages for taxes and social contributions are based on data from the IMF (2018), with the 
exception of Egypt, where data is from 2015; Mexico, India, 2017; New Zealand, 2019; data for Vietnam and India 
are from BCG, 2013 and 2017 respectively. 
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Annex 
 
Table 1 – Total Expenditure by General Government (% of GDP) 
 
Country 2019 2020 2021 
Austria 48.2 56.4 50.9 
Belgium 52.2 59.6 54.2 
Denmark 49.6 59.2 53.5 
Finland 53.3 59.8 56.8 
France 55.6 62.7 57.1 
Germany 45.4 54.2 48.3 
Greece 46.3 55.2 49.0 
Ireland 24.8 29.6 26.6 
Italy 48.7 59.1 52.2 
Netherlands 41.9 47.7 45.6 
Portugal 42.7 49.3 44.5 
Spain 41.9 49.7 45.6 
Sweden 49.3 55.1 52.0 
Other    
Switzerland 35.4 39.8 36.4 
United Kingdom 41.0 48.6 43.4 
Japan 39.1 42.8 42.7 
United States 38.3 49.2 39.0 
    
Average 44.3 51.6 46.9 
European Union 46.7 54.7 49.6 
 
Source: AMECO, Spring 2020. Unweighted average; EU weighted average. 
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Table 2 – Public Expenditure, General Government, by Countries and Country Groups, 
2018 or latest available year (% of GDP) 
Countries 
Total 
spending 
Public 
consumption 
Intermediate 
consumption 
Compensation 
of employees 
Government 
investment 
Net interest 
payments Transfers Subsidies 
Cote d'Ivoire 23.32 NA NA 7.10 2.37 1.83 8.07 2.44 
Egypt 32.76 NA NA 8.22 2.15 7.33 13.36 6.15 
Ethiopia 14.19 NA NA 1.27 3.74 0.50 7.00 0.00 
Kenya 28.24 NA NA 8.81 2.17 3.70 6.38 0.72 
Morocco 37.59 NA NA 5.29 NA 1.14 13.56 5.95 
Nigeria1 12.50 NA NA NA 3.30 NA 1.24 NA 
South Africa 42.28 22.62 NA 14.63 3.20 3.71 10.16 0.67 
Argentina1 41.8 NA NA 11.70 2.00 3.77 9.27 1.40 
Brazil 41.60 20.87 3.47 8.44 1.88 4.55 19.51 0.29 
Canada 41.32 NA 7.29 12.46 3.86 1.67 NA 0.93 
Chile 23.8 16.64 NA 8.81 2.31 0.91 12.47 1.09 
Colombia 43.68 15.52 5.54 7.28 3.39 1.12 11.91 0.11 
Mexico 26.34 NA 3.25 8.44 1.69 2.14 11.11 0.37 
United States 37.95 14.08 6.17 9.50 3.17 3.37 14.93 0.31 
Australia 36.71 17.08 7.88 9.05 3.61 1.14 14.38 1.21 
China 37.10 NA NA 6.37 5.64 0.55 NA NA 
India 27.70 NA NA 1.44 NA 3.11 NA NA 
Indonesia 22.17 9.69 3.94 5.32 3.70 1.36 3.81 1.13 
Korea 32.44 13.39 4.33 6.83 5.07 -0.46 14.01 0.31 
Japan 38.74 12.75 3.66 5.41 3.87 0.26 24.09 0.55 
New Zealand 38.81 16.19 6.26 8.78 4.09 0.67 16.90 0.33 
Saudi Arabia 40.18 NA NA 16.45 NA 0.51 10.66 0.54 
Singapore1 13.88 NA NA 3.78 NA NA NA NA 
Thailand 21.16 NA NA 6.01 3.60 1.01 4.50 0.82 
Vietnam 27.49 NA NA NA NA 1.51 NA NA 
Austria 48.49 17.79 6.08 10.39 2.98 1.33 27.35 1.51 
Belgium 52.38 17.20 4.08 12.25 2.45 1.94 31.54 3.31 
Denmark 51.41 NA 8.80 15.28 3.31 0.15 NA 1.73 
Finland 53.14 NA 10.71 12.31 4.07 0.03 NA 1.18 
France 56.13 NA 4.98 12.52 3.48 1.61 NA 2.68 
Germany 43.87 13.69 4.78 7.57 2.26 0.66 28.49 0.85 
Greece 46.74 NA 4.38 11.76 2.34 3.14 NA 0.84 
Ireland 25.74 NA 3.41 6.98 2.07 1.59 NA 0.53 
Italy 48.58 NA 5.58 9.78 2.14 3.53 NA 1.49 
Netherlands 42.16 14.95 5.82 8.23 3.15 0.70 23.98 1.15 
Norway 48.69 23.30 6.74 14.73 5.43 -2.37 21.26 2.06 
Poland 41.55 NA 5.56 10.11 4.67 1.27 NA 0.43 
Russia 37.63 15.94 5.78 10.25 3.95 0.89 15.23 0.62 
Spain 41.34 17.32 5.02 10.51 2.14 2.27 21.25 1.00 
Sweden 49.88 24.28 7.99 12.67 4.75 -0.05 23.94 1.62 
Switzerland 34.15 13.53 4.92 7.60 3.01 0.17 17.85 3.09 
Turkey 34.45 NA 5.50 8.03 NA 3.03 NA NA 
United Kingdom 40.84 18.56 7.96 8.96 2.61 2.11 19.42 0.86 
 
 
 
33 
 
Source: Data on total expenditure are from OECD (2018), except for Argentina, Australia, Colombia, China, Indonesia, Japan, 
Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Russia, Switzerland, United States (OECD, 2017), Brazil, Chile (OECD, 2016), Cote d'Ivoire, 
Kenya, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Singapore, Thailand (IMF, 2018), Egypt (IMF, 2015), Morocco (IMF, 2011), Ethiopia 
(BCG, 2018), Vietnam (BCG, 2013). 
Data on government investment are from OECD (2018), except for Argentina, Australia, China, Chile, Colombia, India, Japan, 
Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Russia, South Africa, Switzerland, United States (OECD, 2017), Côte d'Ivoire, Thailand (IMF, 2018), 
Egypt (IMF, 2012), Ethiopia and Nigeria (BCG, 2013), Kenya (BCG, 2012), 
Data on net interest payments are from OECD (2018), except for Australia, Colombia, India, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, 
South Africa, Switzerland, United States (OECD, 2017), Argentina, Chile, Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, Russia, Thailand, Turkey, Saudi 
Arabia, Vietnam (IMF, 2018), China (IMF, 2017), Egypt (IMF, 2015), Ethiopia (BCG, 2018), India (BCG, 2017). 
Data on transfers are from IMF (2018), except for Mexico (2017), Egypt (2015), Morocco (2011). Data is from BCG for Ethiopia 
(2018) and Nigeria (2013). 
Data on subsidies are from OECD (2018), except for Argentina, Australia, Colombia, India, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Russia, Switzerland, United States (OECD, 2017), Chile, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Thailand, Saudi Arabia, South Africa (IMF, 2018), 
Egypt (IMF, 2015), Ethiopia (BCG, 2018). 
1 Data for Argentina, Nigeria and Singapore is for Central Government only. 
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Table 3 (cont.) 
Countries Education Health Defense 
Social 
Protection2 
Environmental 
protection 
Public order 
and safety 
Cote d'Ivoire 4.87 1.31 1.48 0.18 0.31 0.91 
Egypt 3.93 1.64 1.97 9.50 0.10 1.97 
Ethiopia 2.10 0.58 0.57 0.74 0.06 0.30 
Kenya 4.63 0.69 1.64 1.11 0.13 1.68 
Morocco NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Nigeria 0.53 0.26 0.38 0.38 NA 0.45 
South Africa 5.67 4.36 0.92 5.55 0.31 3.55 
Argentina1 1.32 1.66 0.39 1.15 0.13 1.01 
Brazil1 2.35 2.12 0.73 14.63 0.07 1.13 
Canada NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Chile 5.22 3.98 0.98 6.23 0.20 2.03 
Colombia 4.84 4.88 1.33 8.96 0.55 2.20 
Mexico NA NA NA NA NA NA 
United States 6.00 9.33 3.16 7.64 0.00 2.01 
Australia 5.78 7.23 2.25 9.68 0.91 1.97 
China 3.73 2.98 1.29 7.22 0.73 1.53 
India 0.49 0.28 1.56 NA NA NA 
Indonesia 2.76 1.40 0.72 1.28 0.21 1.07 
Korea 5.18 4.27 2.45 6.61 0.77 1.34 
Japan 3.32 7.64 0.92 16.15 1.16 1.22 
New Zealand 5.83 6.84 1.04 10.77 0.92 1.98 
Saudi Arabia NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Singapore1 2.71 2.13 2.96 0.96 0.33 1.21 
Thailand 3.07 1.24 1.24 3.00 0.05 1.17 
Vietnam NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Austria 4.85 8.18 0.59 20.53 0.37 1.36 
Belgium 6.33 7.67 0.80 19.55 0.91 1.72 
Denmark 6.49 8.38 1.17 22.38 0.41 0.94 
Finland 5.68 7.07 1.26 24.86 0.20 1.14 
France 5.42 8.03 1.79 24.34 0.95 1.64 
Germany 4.11 7.10 1.05 19.35 0.63 1.53 
Greece 3.87 5.25 2.49 19.42 1.34 2.11 
Ireland 3.26 5.14 0.27 9.48 0.38 1.03 
Italy 3.82 6.82 1.29 20.86 0.90 1.84 
Netherlands 5.13 7.57 1.15 15.89 1.38 1.86 
Norway 5.60 8.54 1.70 19.75 0.91 1.16 
Poland 4.90 4.68 1.69 16.44 0.39 2.13 
Russia 3.45 3.17 1.78 11.54 0.15 2.20 
Spain 3.99 5.95 0.89 16.55 0.86 1.84 
Sweden 6.77 6.91 1.18 20.20 0.31 1.31 
Switzerland 5.64 2.18 0.83 13.54 0.62 1.70 
Turkey 3.71 5.13 1.83 9.87 0.38 2.09 
United Kingdom 4.60 7.43 1.94 15.20 0.72 1.81 
Source: Data for OECD countries except New Zealand and Turkey is from OECD (2017). Data is from IMF for New Zealand 
(2019), Argentina, Brazil, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey (2018), and Egypt (2015). Data is from BCG for 
Ethiopia and Kenya (2018), India (2017), Cote d'Ivoire (2014) and Nigeria (2013). 
1 Data for Argentina, Brazil and Singapore are Central Government only. 2 Social protection expenditure includes spending related 
to sickness and disability, old age, family and children, unemployment, housing, social exclusion, and R&D on social protection. 
